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A range of evidence exists that demonstrates a relationship between social capital and important socio-
economic outcomes. Using a variety of proxies, social capital has been shown to have substantial 
predictive power across a range of domains, including economic growth (Helliwell and Putnam, 1995; 
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001), trade (Guiso et al., 2008), well-functioning institutions 
(Knack, 2002), corruption and crime (Uslaner, 2002; Buonanno et al., 2009) and well working financial 
markets (Guiso et al., 2004). While this literature demonstrates large and long-lived within and across 
country differences in values and social norms, rather less is known about the origins of these differences. 
Recently a body of research has developed which aims to examine the formulation of different types 
of social capital. Generally this literature analyzes the relationship between historical events or historical 
sources of variation and current levels of social capital. For instance, Durante (2010) demonstrates how 
trust developed in pre-industrial times as a form of mutual insurance for agrarian societies to cope with 
climatic risk. He shows that contemporary surveyed variation in trust across Europe is positively related to 
higher temporal volatility in climatic conditions in the 16th century. In a similar vein, Nunn and 
Wantchekon (2011) relate current levels of trust within Africa to historical variation in the geography of      
slave-trade related raids. While Tabellini (2010) shows that current civic values in Italy are correlated with 
historical variables (political institutions in the period from 1600 to 1850) and that the component of 
culture explained by history is in turn correlated with current regional economic development. Other 
research on Italy examines the link between geographical variation in casualties during the unification 
process that may have undermined trust towards authorities and election turnout (Amodio, 2012); or the 
emergence of free-city states in the Middle Ages, the formation of informal pacts, and social capital 
(Guiso et al., 2008). Jacob and Tyrell (2010) show how the density of Stasi informers in the former GDR 
is negatively related to social capital levels in today’s East Germany. The persistence in social norms is 
also documented by Voigtländer et al. (2014), who find that localities where pogroms against Jews took 
place during the Black Death epidemic in the 14th century showed higher levels of deportations and 
persecution of Jews 600 years later, during the interwar period. In addition, Voigtländer and Voth (2014) 
find that the support to anti-Semitic parties in Germany in 1890 and 1920-30s is strongly correlated with 
anti-Semitic attitudes expressed in opinion surveys in 1996 and 2006.  
While this literature suggests long-lasting differences in social capital there is other work 
demonstrating how social capital can be influenced by contemporaneous factors, and hence should be 
viewed as malleable. Much of this literature shows that social capital can be adversely affected by 
increasing ‘openness’, migration and the mixing of communities. For instance, Di Pasquale and Glaeser 
(1999) show that expected mobility reduces social capital, while Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Costa and 
Kahn (2003) and Freire and Li (2013) argue that social capital is affected by inequality and the 
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heterogeneity of communities. These results are in line with the theoretical model proposed by Glaeser et 
al. (2002) according to which social capital investment increases when the return to social skills is higher 
and in communities with higher aggregate social capital, while it tends to decreases with age and 
relocation to a different community. According to these arguments, the increased mobility that has been 
witnessed over the past two centuries should act to dissipate differences in social capital across individuals 
or groups of individuals.  
This paper contributes to this literature but takes a different tack. Specifically, we focus on a unique 
immigration event in Italy that was geographically concentrated. This allows us to ask a number of 
questions related to how persistent initial variations in social capital are over time, but at the same time to 
shed light on issues related to the cultural and social assimilation of immigrant groups. We focus on the 
settlement of large groups of Albanians into southern Italy following the invasion of the Balkans by the 
Ottoman Turks in the late 16th century. Importantly, these groups moved to geographically clustered 
villages within southern Italy. They were granted hospitality and some privileges by the local hosting 
barons and still now their descendants live in some southern Italian villages, whose inhabitants are called 
Arbëreshë.  
They have essentially lived peacefully in southern Italy for more than 500 years. This may reflect the 
fact that their way of life did not disturb the status quo. Some villages formerly populated by Albanian 
have lost their Albanian traits, while others (around 40) scattered in five regions (Apulia, Basilicata, 
Calabria, Molise, Sicily), in the southern part of Italy, still preserve a distinct language (they speak 
Arbërisht, an old variant of Albanian) and/or a distinct religious rite (Greek Orthodox). 
The main thrust of our paper is to investigate whether these populations show different levels of civic 
capital compared to “Italian” groups living in the same geographical area. This is an interesting setting in 
so far as Southern Italy is noted for its poor endowment of social capital (see for instance, Bertoni et al, 
2013 and Paccagnella and Sestito 2014). The Arbëreshë people, apart from preserving a distinct language,  
may have preserved distinct social values, which could be pre-determined or the result of their attempt to 
be accepted in a hosting country. 
We show that this group of individuals displays significantly higher levels of civic capital than 
comparable indigenous groups. Moreover, this is observable for a period (immediate post war) where 
there was limited inter-regional mobility and interaction with other areas; but has not diminished markedly 
in the following half century when mobility substantially increased. This result is important as it 
demonstrates how substantial variations in civic capital can be created by specific historical episodes, and 
that these differences may be very long lasting. This latter point is of clear interest if one considers, as per 
the literature highlighted above, that social capital has a key role in explaining cross-country and within-
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country variations in institutional and economic performance. In addition, our result is of interest insofar 
as it has implications for the role of large-scale migration on social norms. 
To deal with the endogeneity issues that might plague our results we firstly look at successively more 
restrictive geographic comparisons: more proximate areas should differ less in terms of unobserved 
characteristics that influence both civic capital and voter turnout. Then, as an alternative strategy we adopt 
an instrumental variable approach`and use as a source of variation the historical location of two seminaries 
that contributed greatly to the preservation of the Arbëreshë culture. Our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged and instrumental variable estimates are larger in magnitude compared to OLS estimates, 
suggesting that unobservable confounding factors produced a downward bias. 
We extend this in an attempt to examine whether differences in voting behavior are likely driven by 
underlying differences in civic attitudes. Typical proxies for social capital (blood donations, crimes etc) 
are available only at a provincial level and hence not suitable for our analysis. Instead, we use 
municipality level data sourced from RAI TV on the payment of the television license tax. This data 
allows us to build a measure of tax compliance that we use as an alternative dependent variable in our 
models. These results, insofar as the Arbëreshë have higher compliance rates, provide a further indication 
that these communities display ‘better’ civic behavior. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that 
neither population homogeneity nor the retention of the orthodox religion are sufficient explanations of 
the observed differences in behavior.   
The paper is organized as follows. In section II it is provided information on the historical 
background. Section III discusses the data, while section IV presents the empirical methodology. Section 
V presents the main results. Section VI presents instrumental variable estimates while section VII presents 
further extensions and robustness checks. Section VIII concludes.  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
We focus on a unique migration event that occurred in Italy in the late 16th century following the 
invasion of the Balkans by the Ottoman Turks. There is a general agreement that the migration period was 
from 1448 to 1543 and that there were three main waves (see Scaglione, 1921, and Zangari, 1940). The 
first two migrations waves (1448-1459) were the consequence of the political alliance between the 
Albanian chieftain George Kastrioti Skanderbeg, who unified the Albanian tribes against the Ottoman 
invasion, and the Italian aristocracy (Pedio, 1943). In two occasions (in 1448 and in 1459 respectively) the 
king of Naples appealed to Skanderbeg for aid in suppressing revolts. After the military interventions the 
Albanian mercenaries asked and obtained hospitality, settling in a number of villages. The main migration 
wave was the third one occurring immediately before the defeat of the Albanian resistance (1480) when 
the hope of victory over the Turks began to fade. From 1470 to 1480 many Albanians received hospitality 
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in southern Italy. They were directed towards specific territories based on the necessity of repopulating 
some areas and to fill the lack of labor in some feudal areas, avoiding, at the same time, too much 
concentration of Albanians and potential conflict with local populations. The Albanian immigrants were 
accepted by the local barons and obtained some privileges, such as the right to speak their own language 
and tax relief. The Pope allowed them to keep the Greek-Byzantine rite and exempted them from paying 
tributes to the Church.2 These facts might have shaped the expectations of trustworthiness towards the 
political authority. In addition, these people, being refugees in a hosting country, might have built social 
ties among them and developed cooperative attitudes enabling them to achieve collective goods. This 
process is at the origin of the development of several communities in the South of Italy: many villages in 
the regions of Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Molise and Sicily, were founded or repopulated by Albanians. 
A variety of historical sources report that in the 17th century about a hundred Italian villages were 
populated primarily by Albanians.3  
No reliable historical sources exist that establish whether these migrants, compared to the indigenous 
populations living in the same areas, were from a ‘better’ social background. However, modern historians 
argue that Albanian high-caste dignitaries were not present among the refugees of the 16th century nor 
among the other migration waves. Instead, these immigrants were ordinary people accompanied by a few 
Orthodox priests. Similar to the other populations living in the area, they were mainly shepherds, farmers, 
peasants, while nobles and wealthier people moved to major towns, such as Venice, Naples and Palermo 
(Bugliaro, 2002). Nevertheless, we are not able to establish whether these immigrants left their country 
with different resources in terms of both human and social capital and whether these endowments were 
passed on to following generations.  
Possibly as a consequence of the fact that their way of life did not disturb the status quo, and 
because they have been in many circumstances loyal to the Italian state, the Arbëreshë were accepted and 
they have lived peacefully in southern Italy for more than 500 years. The Arbëreshë have never had a 
political or ethnic conflict with the Italian State and never claimed or desired separation or autonomy. 
Instead, they consider themselves Italians who in addition have Albanian origins (Derhemi, 2002).4 The 
Arbëreshë strongly contributed to the Italian Risorgimento and to the military campaigns that lead to the 
country unification in 1861. To give an idea of the role played by this minority in the Italian unification 
                                                 
2Thanks to the intervention of Pope Paul II many local barons granted them land at better conditions that those 
granted to indigenous Italian populations. However, during the Counter Reformation the Catholic Church tried to 
impose its own rite with partial success.  
3 A small number of ethnic Albanians were present in Italy before this time.  
4Arbëreshë elite families actively sought integration in Italian society through intermarriage, mainly involving 
members of the Italian elite. Francesco Crispi (1818-1901), one of the former Italian Prime Ministers after the 
unification of Italy and Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) a founding member and leader of the Italian Communist Party, 
were of Albanian descents. 
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process it is useful to report that three of the six ministers appointed by Garibaldi (who commanded and 
fought in many military campaigns that led to the formation of a unified Italy) for his provisional 
government were from Arbëreshë villages.5 
No information exists regarding which villages were populated by Albanians in the 16th century. 
Some historical information is available on villages whose origin is thought to have been Albanian but 
which now retain no or slight traces of their past heritage.6 The first reliable information on Albanian 
communities in Italy is from the 1861 census of the Italian population, which provides information of the 
share of population speaking the Arbërisht in each village. From this source we found that in 47 villages 
there was a share of population (ranging from 4% to 100%) speaking Arbërisht.7 This share was smaller 
than 50% in only five villages, while in the others on average 91% of the population had preserved the 
Arbërisht language. The fascist government stopped gathering data on the Italo-Albanian-speaking 
population and all other minority groups, and this has persisted since. As a result, there are no official 
statistics on the proportion of the population that still speaks the Arbërisht language.  
Currently, the Arbëreshë minority is estimated to number approximately 90,000-100,000 people 
living mainly in 41 villages in which most of the inhabitants still preserve the Arbërisht language and 
and/or observe Greek orthodox rites (Altimari and Savoia, 1994). In our analysis we consider as Arbëreshë 
the 41 villages still now preserving one of these traits. However, our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged even if we focus on the 45 villages (we exclude the two villages located in Abruzzo and 
Campania) taken from the 1961 census or if we consider the share of population today speaking the 
Arbërisht language gathered from a current survey of the mayors of Arbëreshë villages. 
According to experts (see Cucci, 2007), a major contributor to the preservation of the Arbëreshë 
culture comes from the institution, in the 18th century, of two seminaries, one located in Calabria and the 
other on the island of Sicily. The Collegio Corsini was founded in 1732 in San Benedetto Ullano 
(Calabria). In 1794 it was moved to San Demetrio Corone and the name changed to Collegio 
                                                 
5 They were Luigi Giura, Pasquale Scura and Francesco Crispi. The Arbëreshë  commitment to these political causes 
is also reflected in their popular songs in which they compare the Italian hero Garibaldi to the Albania hero 
Skanderbeg (Serra, 1969).   
6 Among the villages whose people have become integrated with the Italians some sources (Nasse, 1964) report: 
Arlette, Cavallerizzo, Cervicati, Farneta, Gizzeria, Macchia, Porcile, Rota, Vena, Zangarona,  Colle di Lauro, 
Santacroce di Magliano, Sant’Elena Sannita, Bronte, Biancavilla, San Michele di Ganzaria, Sant’Angelo, Faeto, 
Faggiano, Martignano, Panni, San Paolo 
7 These villages are in Abruzzo (Villa Badessa), Apulia (Casalvecchio di Puglia, Chieuti, Monteparano, San Marzano 
di San Giuseppe), in Basilicata (Barile, Ginestra, Maschito, San Costantino Albanese, San Paolo Albanese), in 
Calabria (Acquaformosa, Amato, Andali, Carfizzi, Castroregio, Cerzeto, Civita, Falconara Albanese, Firmo, 
Frascineto, Lungro, Marcedusa, Mongrassano, Pallagorio, Plataci, San Basile, San Benedetto Ullano, San Cosmo 
Albanese, San Demetrio, San Giacomo, San Giorgio Albanese, San Martino di Finita, San Nicola dell’Alto, Santa 
Caterina Albanese, Santa Sofia d’Epiro, Spezzano Albanese, Vaccarizzo Albanese), in Campania (Greci), in Molise 
(Campomarino, Montecilfone, Portocannone, and Ururi), in Sicily (Contessa Entellina, Palazzo Adriano, Piana degli 
Albanesi, Mezzoiuso, Santa Cristina di Gela).  
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Sant’Adriano. In the same period (1734), in Sicily, Palermo, the Greek college later called “Collegio 
Greco-Albanese” was founded. These seminaries trained members of the Arbëreshë clergy, together with a 
large number of professionals. These seminaries were important as cultural centers and for the 
maintenance of the Arbëreshë language and the Greek orthodox rite.8 Figure 1 depicts a map of Italy, 
which highlights the regions interested by the Arbëreshë immigration, and – within those regions – the 
location of the Arbëreshë villages and of the two seminaries. 
 
III.  DATA  
Arbëreshë villages are in many ways similar to other villages of southern Italy (there are no 
differences in the house type, land use, diet, clothing, education), however, after more than 500 years from 
the arrival of their ancestors in a region where they had almost no contact from their homeland, their 
inhabitants have demonstrated a substantial degree of cultural resilience. The aim of our research is to 
understand whether these villages display significantly different levels of social capital than comparable 
indigenous ‘Italian’ groups. 
A key issue in examining social capital is measurement. As highlighted by Guiso et al (2010), it is 
increasingly clear that social capital is an ambiguous term that has been invoked in a range of ways that 
are not necessarily consistent.9 Guiso et al (2010) suggest the alternative concept of “civic capital” as a set 
of values and beliefs that facilitate co-operation. Specifically, it is these “persistent and shared beliefs and 
values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities” 
(Guiso et al, 2010, p.3).  
Existing empirical work aimed at measuring civic capital focuses on one of two approaches. The first 
approach is to use survey responses on questions regarding trust, such as those commonly included in the 
major value or social surveys. An alternative approach is based on revealed-preference style proxies that 
are connected to civic capital by some view of socialization; such as charitable giving or election turnout. 
In this paper, we focus on these latter types of measures, as we believe that these measures are more 
convincing as stakes are attached to this behavior.  
More precisely, we focus on a variety of measures of voter turnout, which fit with a key concept of 
civic capital, the propensity to cooperate and help in the creation of collective goods (Amodio, 2012; 
Guiso et al. 2010). While other forms of civic behavior are clearly interesting, a clear advantage of this 
data for our purposes is that turnout is measured accurately and at a municipality level. We firstly consider 
                                                 
8 In 1805 the Collegio Corsini seminar was transformed in a Lyceum devoted at providing education in classical and 
scientific studies to the young Arbëreshë. 
9 This raises concerns regarding the measurement of social capital, how it can be ‘accumulated’, and more 
fundamentally the comparability of research that often uses vastly different proxies to measure its effect. 
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referenda turnout since this is a measure of social capital widely used in the economic literature. However, 
as we only have data for the 2011 national referenda,10 we also consider European Election turnout for the 
period 1979-2014. European elections are comparable with referenda since turnout at these elections is 
unlikely to be driven by economic incentives;11 due to these reasons data on these elections have been 
already used as a proxy of civic capital (see for instance Amodio, 2012; Barone and Mocetti, 2014).  
Finally, we also examine participation at the general elections, using data on Italian parliamentary 
elections of the lower house of the Parliament (Camera dei Deputati). Existing research demonstrates that 
generalized interpersonal trust and norms of reciprocity are strongly correlated with turnout (Newton, 
1997; Putnam, 1995; Putnam, Leonard and Nanetti, 1993; Seligson, 1999). A key advantage of these data 
is that they cover a relatively long period (1946-2008), which allows us to investigate if civic behavior has 
changed across the post-war period. Data on turnout at the 2011 referenda and at European elections are 
provided by the Italian Ministry of the Internal Affairs, while data for the Italian Parliament are form the 
“Atlante Storico-Elettorale d’Italia”. We measure Turnout as the ratio between the number of voters and 
the number of eligible voters.  
As the Arbëreshë municipalities are a small minority living in very specific areas of Italy, there is a 
difficulty in finding a clean counterfactual group to compare their behavior to. Our initial starting point is 
to restrict our attention to regions in which there is at least an Arbëreshë community and to consider only 
municipalities with less than 8,704 inhabitants (in the 2001 census the largest Arbëreshë municipality has 
8703 inhabitants while the remaining Arbëreshë municipalities have on average about 2000 inhabitants). 
In practice, this restricts our sample to about 961 municipalities, 41 Arbëreshë municipalities (treated 
group) and 920 indigenous municipalities, located in five different regions (Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, 
Molise and Sicily).12 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, data on turnout at the most relevant referenda held in Italy are not available at municipality level. 
Data on important Italian referenda asking people to express their views on issues such as the legalization of divorce 
(1974) and abortion (1981) are only available at provincial level and as a result we cannot use them for our analysis. 
The 2011 referenda were held on national-level issues such as the ownership of local public utility companies and 
banning the construction of nuclear power plants. 
11 The supranational nature of the European Parliament makes electoral turnout less subject to contamination 
problems due to patronage. 
12 One may be concerned that there is a degree of arbitrariness in the choice of comparison municipalities. In 
unreported estimates we adopted a more systematic approach via estimating a propensity score matching model of 
the probability of a municipality being Arbëreshë. We then used these scores to trim potential comparison 
municipalities off the common support (i.e. those with a propensity score below the lowest for an actual Arbëreshë 
village). This was only possible for our estimates of the effect on referenda and European elections turnout; the same 
technique could not be applied to the general election turnout as appropriate matching variables where not readily 




As shown in Table 1, average turnout in Arbëreshë municipalities is higher than turnout in indigenous 
municipalities both when considering the 2011 referenda and European elections. Instead, the reverse is 




To control for municipalities’ demographic characteristics, we match each election with the closest 
Italian Census of Population held every ten years (we use data from 1951 to 2001).13 We have information 
on the size of resident population, the average level of employment, the educational attainment of the 
population and the percentage of people aged 65 or over.14 We use this information to compare Arbëreshë 
and indigenous municipalities. In Table 2 the mean for the demographic characteristics together with 
geographic characteristics are reported, both for Arbëreshë and non-Arbëreshë municipalities. In the first 
three columns we consider the 1951 Italian Census, while in the last three columns we refer to the latest 
available census, held in 2001 (results do not qualitatively change even when we collapse our data and 
compare the average values taken in the period 1951-2001 by our variables of interest). Differences in 
means between Arbëreshë municipalities and non-Arbëreshë municipalities are presented in columns 3 




 Our results show that Arbëreshë and non-Arbëreshë municipalities are comparable in terms of a 
number of observable characteristics: there are no significant differences between the two groups in terms 
of employment, average schooling, altitude, size of the territory under the jurisdiction of each 
municipality. There are, however, some statistically significant differences in terms of population (when 
considering the 2001 census), the proportion of the population that is older than 65 and the illiteracy rate. 
Most notably, Arbëreshë municipalities tend to be smaller and to have a higher percentage of elderly and 
                                                 
13 Data from Census 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001 are accessible through Statistical Atlas of Municipalities (Atlante 
Statistico dei Comuni) (ISTAT, 2009). There are no readily usable data from Census 1951 and 1961 and we obtained 
the data by examining the volumes  “Censimento della Popolazione” distributed by the Italian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs in hard copy.  
14 More precisely we use data from the 1951 census for general elections held from 1946 to 1953, data from the 1961 
census for general elections held from 1958 to 1963, data from the 1971 census for elections held from 1968 to 1976. 
Data from the 1981 census are used for general and European elections held in the period 1979-1984. Instead for 
elections held in the period 1989-1994 we use data from the 1991 census, while data from the 2001 census are used 
for elections held after 1994. 
15 The difference in the number of observations is due to missing data or to the fact that new municipalities were 
created from 1951 to 2001. 
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illiterate people. Our expectation, in terms of our subsequent empirical analysis, is that this difference 
should lead to, at worst, a conservative (i.e. biased towards zero) estimate of the effect of social capital on 
behavior. For instance, one would expect lower literacy levels to lead to, if anything, a lower level of 
voting turnout. While this suggests a lack of observable confounding factors between our villages of 
interest and comparison villages, unobservable confounding factors may still exist. Even if we cannot 
directly test this, in our subsequent empirical analysis we take a number of steps aimed at assessing the 
robustness of our results. 
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
The initial empirical analysis involves estimation of an OLS model with fixed effects at a regional or 
provincial level16 to analyze whether Arbëreshë municipalities display significantly different levels of 
civic capital compared to similar Italian municipalities. More precisely, we estimate variants of the 
following model: 
[1]      ittiitiit XArberesheTurnout   210    
 
where itTurnout  is the outcome variable (voter turnout at referenda, at European elections and at general 
elections) in municipality i in election year t;   iArbereshe   is our main variable of interest and it takes a 
value equal to 1 for the 41 villages still maintaining Arbëreshë traits; itX  is a vector of municipal 
characteristics at the time of elections, such as the population size, the average number of years of 
education of the inhabitants, the fraction of employed people in the population, the fraction of elderly 
people; i  and t  are respectively region or province (more disaggregated) and an electoral year fixed 
effect, whereas it  is the stochastic error term of the model.  
Arbëreshë villages are a subset of all original villages that were settled or repopulated by the 
Albanians, and this maintenance of tradition is likely to be non-random. A concern would be that those 
areas, with unobservable characteristics more likely to lead to different levels of social capital, are also 
related to differential likelihood of the maintenance of these traditions. For instance, more isolated areas 
may be less likely to converge to Italian social norms in both terms of observed traditions and voting 
behavior. 
To examine this issue we firstly look at successively more restrictive geographic comparisons. Again 
the underlying idea is that more proximate areas should differ less in terms of unobserved characteristics 
                                                 
16 Provinces are the lower-tier administrative institution, placed between municipalities (our unit of observation) and 
regions (such as Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Molise and Sicily). 
12 
 
that influence both civic capital and voter turnout. We estimate variants of our model where we 
successively reduce the comparison group to municipalities within 60kms and 30kms of an Arbëreshë 
municipality. 
Finally, we use the historical location of two seminaries that according to researchers gave a great 
contribution to the preservation of the Arbëreshë culture as a source of variation. This information is at the 
basis of our 2SLS estimation strategy, specifying the model presented above as follows: 
    
[2]         ittiitiit XArberesheTurnout   210    
[3]         ittitiii XDistDistArbereshe   3221     
  
From equations [2] and [3] we can notice that iArbereshe  might be positively or negatively correlated 
with the error term it , leading to biased estimates in the province fixed effects model. For instance, some 
unobservable features of iArbereshe  municipalities embedded in the error term of equation [1], may 
affect both the maintenance of Arbëreshë peculiar traits and voters’ decision to cast their vote.  
As we only observe the subset of Arbëreshë communities still maintaining some peculiar traits, our 
instrument relies on the idea (supported for instance by Altimari, 2002, and Cucci, 2007) that cultural 
resilience has been affected by the closeness to two seminaries, founded to provide free education to the 
Arbëreshë clergy. Then, we instrument our dummy iArbereshe  with the distance of each municipality to 
the municipality in which is located the closest seminary. Since the two seminaries are located one in 
mainland Italy (San Demetrio) and the other on the island of Sicily (Palermo), we consider the distance 
from the Sicilian seminary for municipalities located in that region and the distance from the one located 
in the mainland for all the others.17 Clearly the initial location choice for the seminaries may not have 
been random. Nevertheless, their construction occurred in the 18th century and we argue that these location 
choices were driven by factors that are unlikely to be directly related to current civic behavior. As one may 
expect the effect of proximity to be non-linear, we introduce a quadratic term in distance. We also 




                                                 
17 For the seminar located in Calabria we refer to the San Demetrio location. Nevertheless our estimates do not 
change much if we alternatively use the initial location of the seminar in San Benedetto Ullano. The distance 
between San Demetrio and San Benedetto Ullano is 30 Km. 
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V. OLS RESULTS 
Table 3 provides regional fixed effects estimates of the conditional correlation between Arbëreshë 
communities and voter turnout. We report results for the 2011 national referenda, the European Parliament 
elections (1979-2014) and the general elections (1946-2008), respectively. In all regressions standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
For all our turnout measures these reveal a statistically significant relationship. For instance, as 
shown in column (1), where we only control for regional dummies, referenda turnout is 2.7 percentage 
points higher in Arbëreshë communities. Since turnout at referenda in indigenous municipalities is on 




As shown in column (3), the corresponding relationship is 3.4 percentage points for turnout at the 
European elections (on a base of about 66% this translates in an increase of about 5%). The relationship 
between turnout at general elections and Arbëreshë (column 4) shows a similar albeit smaller effect, with a 
1% increase in turnout. 
 Models reported in columns (2), (4) and (6), introduce controls for a range of potential confounders. 
These explanatory variables are related to voter turnout in a manner that fits with previous literature and 
intuition. For instance, the rate of illiteracy is negatively related with turnout, while the share of employed 
population is positively related with turnout. Introducing these controls substantially improves the ‘fit’ of 
these models but does not substantively change the key estimate of interest.18 These remain statistically 
significant for all of our turnout measures. 
We control for the average number of years of education of population in estimates for referenda and 
European-election turnout. This is not included in the general election estimates that cover longer time 
periods, as it is not readily available for the older censuses.  
 These relationships are essentially conditional associations and a number of factors exist that may 
prevent them from being treated causally. There may, for instance, be variations in unobservable 
characteristics between Arbëreshë and non-Arbëreshë communities that may be correlated with turnout 
behavior and civic capital in general. Our first attempt to address this is to restrict the level of comparison 
by introducing province-level fixed effects to our estimates. In this way we seek to wash out unobservable 
factors influencing turnout behavior that relate to specific areas of Italy. The resultant estimates of the 
models including the full set of controls are provided in Table 4. 
                                                 
18 These results do not change qualitatively also when we control for the average income per capita in each 
municipality and for a poverty index (only available starting form 2009). These results are not reported and available 
upon request.  
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Our key estimate now can be interpreted as the within province variation in turnout behavior 
associated with a community being Arbëreshë. As shown in columns (1), (2) and (3) for turnout at 
referenda, European and general elections respectively, while there is some movement in the point 
estimates, there remains a positive and statistically significant relationship between Arbëreshë 
communities and voter turnout behavior. The magnitude of the effects is similar, slightly smaller, to that 






As an alternative approach to within-province estimation we also looked at successively more 
restrictive geographic comparisons. Again the underlying idea is that more proximate areas should differ 
less in terms of unobserved characteristics that influence both civic capital and voter turnout. Here, we use 
provincial fixed effects and estimate variants of our models from Table 4, including the full set of controls 
(not reported to save space), where we successively reduce the comparison group to municipalities within 
60kms and 30kms of an Arbëreshë municipality.19 These estimates are reported in Table 5. These reveal 
that our initial results remain in essence even in the most narrow geographic comparison group.  
Taken together this is supportive of a causal difference insofar as neighboring municipalities, 
controlling for observed differences, differ markedly in their turnout behavior on the basis of their ethnic 
composition. This evidence is suggestive of differences of behavior that reflect higher levels of civic 
capital within Arbëreshë municipalities.   
[TABLE 5] 
 
Having established a contemporaneous relationship between Arbëreshë communities and our 
indicator of civic capital, a natural question is whether this difference in behavior represents a diminished 
differential compared to, for instance, larger differences from the native population upon initial 
immigration. In this sense, we are interested in whether there is an indication of assimilation of immigrant 
behavior towards the norms of the recipient country. To investigate this we use the general election turnout 
data to examine behavior across the post-war period. While this is not the same as examining changes in 
behavior since the 17th century, it provides indicative evidence insofar as the post-war period represents 
one of increased geographic and social mobility. Specifically, we introduce a linear time trend, t, and an 
                                                 
19 The National Statistical Office (ISTAT) provides the geo-coding of all the Town Halls of the 8101 Italian 
municipalities. Through these data, for each municipality the “crow’s flight” distance with each of the Arbëreshë 
municipalities is calculated. If the minimum of these distances is larger than the threshold, the municipality is 
discarded from the analysis. 
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interaction term between the dummy denoting Arbëreshë municipalities and the time trend, Arbereshe*t, 
among the regressors.  
As shown in column (7) and (8) there is a general decline in turnout over the period of approximately 
0.3 of a percentage point per year (we observe 18 elections in our data period). The interaction term 
between Arbëreshë municipalities and year, while negative, is not statistically significant at standard 
levels. This suggests that at best there is weak evidence of convergence of Arbëreshë and non- Arbëreshë 
behavior over the post-war periods. We contend that this, in addition to earlier estimates, is a powerful 
result insofar as it demonstrates the ability of different civil capital to persist even during a period of 
increasing mobility and interaction.  
 
VI. Instrumental Variable Results 
Despite our attempts to investigate the sensitivity of our results to appropriate comparison areas, we 
cannot rule out that our results are driven by underlying differences in unobservable characteristics. As 
explained above, a particular concern is that we are measuring the effect of ex post being an Arbëreshë 
community. This is a concern as this is a subset of areas where initial settlement occurred and the 
maintenance of tradition is likely to be non-random. Most critically, those areas where differences in 
underlying civic capital were greatest may be those municipalities where we might expect these 
communities to survive as recognizably distinct groups. We seek to directly examine this source of bias 
using an instrumental variable approach that exploits exogenous variation in the likelihood of maintaining 
traditions.  
Table 6 provides the IV estimates that correspond to equations (2) and (3). Panel B of the Table 
provides the first stage estimates. These reveal a strong negative relationship between distance to a 
seminary location and being an Arbëreshë community. The square term is positive, and the turning point is 
at the most distant quartile of the distribution (the turning point is between 130 and 180km according to 
specifications). Our instruments pass standard tests for weak instruments. The value of 2  in all 
specifications is well above the standard thresholds.  
Panel A of Table 6 reports second stage estimates for region and province fixed effects models 
controlling for the full set of controls. In the specifications including province fixed effects only 
municipalities located in provinces in which there is at least one Arbëreshë community are included in the 
sample (being included in a province in which Arbëreshë are absent perfectly predicts the outcome 
variable and is dropped from our probit estimates). In all specifications standard errors are bootstrapped 
(100 replications). 
In both the regional and province fixed effects models, the IV estimates are positive and statistically 
significant. The magnitude of the difference in turnout behavior between Arbëreshë and indigenous 
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municipalities is larger in regional fixed effects estimates than in province fixed effects estimates. In all 
cases we find that the instrumental variables estimates are larger in size compared to OLS estimates. For 
instance, as shown in column (2), when controlling for province fixed effects, referenda turnout is 11.7 
percentage points higher in Arbëreshë communities (which on a base of 53% implies an increase of about 
22%). The corresponding effect is 5.6 percentage points for general elections (column 6), which implies a 
7% increase. Instead, in the case of turnout at European elections this estimate is particularly large: 17 
percentage points.  
Together, these results suggest that our earlier estimates are not being driven by non-random 




To this point we have demonstrated a robust relationship between Arbëreshë communities and voting 
behavior. We next perform some additional robustness checks and explore a range of extensions aimed 
primarily at demonstrating whether this is likely to be due to pro-social behavior more generally and the 
extent to which this is specific to these communities.  
Arbëreshë enclaves have not been totally segregated from the rest of Italy since settlement. For 
instance, mixed marriages and in-migration may have led to a potential dilution of local attitudes.20 
However, as the villages we examine are located in a very poor area in-migration is a relatively negligible 
phenomenon. In addition, as shown by Resta (1991), until recently, differences in ethnicity and language 
represented barriers that impeded inter-marriage between the two groups.21 Only in the 1960s and 1970s, 
with the improvement in regional infrastructure, work-related migration to central Europe and northern 
Italy and the diffusion of educational programs, have marital exchanges converged to rates observed in the 
surrounding populations. In the current setting, non-Arbëreshë immigrants reside in Arbëreshë villages, 
especially individuals who married Arbëreshë men and women. Unfortunately, there is no accurate 
information that allows us to distinguish between non-Arbëreshë and Arbëreshë individuals living in Italo-
Albanian villages.22 As an alternative to official records we contacted the Mayoral office of each of the 41 
villages and asked (in his/her opinion) what proportion of inhabitants continued to speak the Arbërisht 
                                                 
20 Migration out of these villages is not a source of bias unless it was selective based on pro-civic attitudes. In case of 
migration in surrounding villages we would expect a down-ward bias in our estimates. 
21 For instance, Fiorini et al. (2007), using marriage records, show that different ethnicity was the dominant 
constraint to marital exchanges among the Arbëreshë during the 1800s and during the first three decades of the 20th 
century.  
22 Similarly, it is not possible to count the Arbëreshë that emigrated to the North of Italy or abroad, as they are 
“hidden” in the general population of the places where they have settled. 
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language.23 This proportion, that we name Arbereshe Intensity, ranges from 0% to 100% with a mean 
value of 64%. We then use this information in place of our Arbëreshë indicator variable and re-estimate 
our main fixed effects models of voter turnout. This is reported in Table 7, Panel A. This reveals that 
turnout behavior is increasing in the proportion of the population who speak Arbërisht.24 For instance, 
when looking at turnout at the referenda we find that in villages with 50% of the population speaking 
Arbërisht turnout is about 1.85 percentage points higher compared to villages in which nobody speaks that 
language. Similar magnitude effects are apparent with respect to turnout at European elections. 
[TABLE 7] 
 
Voting behavior is just one potential measure of pro-social behavior. Many of the standard candidates 
for proxies for social capital (e.g. blood donations) are not available at a suitable level of geographical 
disaggregation. However, we are able to construct a measure of tax evasion at the municipality level. We 
do this by focus on a very specific form of taxation, the payment of the television license tax, that is 
available at a municipality level. This data is advantageous as it is a relatively small tax (112 Euros p.a.) 
with essentially no exemptions.25  If a household owns a TV set, they are required to purchase a license. It 
is also very weakly enforced, easy to evade and typical fines for a household are low relative to cost (up to 
516 Euros plus a mandatory 5 year license purchase). As a result approximately one third of households 
do not purchase a licence.26 Taken together, this makes it an opportune instrument for assessing social 
attitudes to taxation.  
The dependent variable Compliance is constructed by dividing the number of TV licenses issued in a 
municipality by the number of households in the same municipality. This implies that in absence of 
measurement error and in case of full compliance the variable takes value 1, while the smaller the value of 
this variable (i.e. the fewer the households per TV license) the higher the evasion rate.  
[TABLE 8] 
 
Table 8 reports variants of our earlier main models where the dependent variable is the TV License 
Compliance Rate. In columns 1-3 we show the results of the OLS regression with different locality fixed 
                                                 
23 We wrote an e-mail asking the following question: According to your opinion which is the fraction of the 
population in your village still speaking the Arbërist language? Respondents could select: 1) Only few; 2) Less than 
20% of the population; 3) 30%-40% of the population; 4) About 50% of the population; 6) About 60% of the 
population; 7) About 70% of the population; 8) About 80% of the population; 9) About 90% of the population; 10) 
About 100% of the population. In the case that mayors did not reply to our e-mail, we contacted them by phone. 
24 In unreported estimates, tax compliance is also increasing in Arbëreshë intensity.  
25 Household including only people over 75 years old with a (household) gross income under Euro 6,713.98, foreign 
diplomatic personnel, and NATO military forces are the only exempted subjects. 
26 In 2010, 67.5% of households held a TV licence (16,654,612 licences were issued by RAI TV, as opposed to 
24,641,200 households reported by the latest National Statistical Office ISTAT figure). The ISTAT “Aspects of 




effects (resp. no fixed effects, regional and provincial), while in columns 4 we show the results of our IV 
approach (again with regional and then provincial fixed effects). Importantly, the pattern of results largely 
follows those reported for our turnout measures in Tables 3-6, albeit with some loss in precision. The OLS 
regressions show that Arbëreshë communities have a higher compliance rate, but one that is of a small 
magnitude. The IV estimates suggests larger, substantive, effects in the order of 10 percentage point higher 
compliance rates. Qualitatively very similar results are found when we consider as independent variable 
Arbereshe Intensity (results not reported and available upon request). Nonetheless, these results are 
supportive of the view that our earlier findings reflect more broad differences in behavior, rather than 
being related purely to voting and political involvement. 
Nevertheless still we are left with a question of the channel of effect. Why do these populations 
behave better in terms of social capital? One candidate is that these villages simply have more 
homogenous populations and this is associated with better civic behavior (see for instance Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2000; Hardin, 1993, Misztal, 1995). While we cannot rule this out this seems an unlikely source 
given our comparison group drawn from proximate villages. These areas, are poor and characterized by 
low in and out migration, and ethnically homogenous. Along these lines, we examined data from the 
Bilancio Demografico Italiano, released by the Italian National Institute of Statistics. These demonstrated 
that that in-migration and out-migration in Arbëreshë and non Arbëreshë villages are very similar, and 
very low (up to 2% p.a.). 
We further examined this point by exploiting the existence of ethnically homogenous Greek enclaves 
(who speak a Greek dialect) in the south of Italy. These Greek speaking enclaves are located in Apulia27 
(Griko) and Calabria28 (Grecanico). There is some contention regarding the origin of these enclaves with 
respect to whether they reflect settlement during the Byzantine Empire (330 A.D. to 1453 A.D.) or are the 
continuation of settlement from Ancient Greece started during Classical Hellenic period (circa 8th century 
B.C.). 29  Similarly to the Arbëreshë these communities are homogenous due differences in language and 
ethnicity that restricted inter-marriage with the surrounding populations.30 To investigate the behavior of 
these enclaves, we include a dummy variable for these municipalities in our main fixed effects models. 
Estimates are reported in Table 7, Panel B. While the Arbëreshë coefficient remains positive and greater 
than zero, the coefficient for the Greek municipalities is essentially zero. While not definitive, this placebo 
                                                 
27 In the villages: Calimera,	 Castrignano	 dei	 Greci,	 Corigliano	 di	 Otranto,	Martano,	Martignano,	 Melpignano,	
Soleto,	Sternatia,	and	Zollino	(see	,	Profili,	1985). 
28 In the villages: Amendolea, Bagaladi, Brancaleone, Bova, Bova Marina, Condofuri, Gallicianò, Melito, Roghudi, 
Roccaforte del Greco, San Lorenzo, Staiti (see, Katsoyannou, 2001 and Viola 1997). 
29 Morosi, 1870; Rohlfs 1966, 1972 
30 It must be noted though that in these comunities the orthodox rite was abandoned since the Norman domination 
(1000 A.D). See Loude and Metcalfe, 2002. 
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tests suggests that it is no purely homogeneity causing the observed differences in behavior between the 
Arbëreshë and proximate communities.  
A further channel that could drive our results is the retention of the orthodox religion. The previous 
literature on the relationship between religion and social capital (measured for instance in terms of trust) 
find that Catholics show significantly less trust than Protestants (Uslaner, 2000) and that hierarchical 
religions produce a negative effect on trust (La Porta et al., 1997; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006).  
The impact produced by the orthodox religion on social capital is less explored also because orthodox 
countries are often also ex-communist countries. We exploit the fact that approximately half of our 
Arbëreshë communities no longer formally observe the Orthodox rites. During the Counter Reformation 
(beginning with the Council of Trent (1545–1563) and ending a century later) the Catholic Church tried to 
impose their own rites with some successful results depending also on the availability of Orthodox priests 
(Altimari and Savoria, 1994). Today villages maintaining the orthodox rite belong to two Eparchies (to 
Lungro for Arbëreshë in continental Italy, and that of Piana degli Albanesi for the Arbëreshë of Sicily). We 
use this information to split our Arbëreshë indicator based on this observance. These results are reported in 
Table 7, Panel C. Two things are worth noting. First, generally both sets of estimates are positive. All 
Arbëreshë communities exhibit higher turnout. There is, however, some indication that the orthodox 
communities have the highest turnout, but the two sets of estimates are never statistically different from 
each other at standard levels. Insofar as the retention of the orthodox religion proxies maintenance of 
Arbëreshë conditions, this provides suggestive evidence that the differences in behavior we estimate are 
driven by underlying ethnic attitudinal differences.  
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
There is an increasing body of research, which seeks to understand the extent to which differences in 
social, and particularly civic capital lead to differences in economic and social behavior. This paper adds 
to this literature focusing on a unique historical immigration event in Italy in the 16th century. This is of 
interest insofar as it represents the mass settlement of a group with markedly different traditions into an 
established society.  
Focusing on an established measure of civic capital, voter turnout, our initial results suggest that 
despite the long time since this event these communities still display different, higher, civic capital than 
other comparable Italian communities. This survives a number of robustness checks including focusing on 
very small geographic points of comparison and instrumental variable estimation aimed at addressing the 
non-random maintenance of traditions. We also demonstrate that our results extend to other proxies of 
social capital such as tax compliance and that they cannot be explained solely in terms of population 
homogeneity or retention of the orthodox religion. 
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We are not able to demonstrate whether these immigrants were characterized by pre-immigration 
differences in social capital or whether an attitude toward cooperation and trust has developed as a 
consequence of the facts following their immigration. Nevertheless we think our analysis is important to 
document long-term persistence in differences in social capital. A point of novelty from previous literature 
is to consider how this variation in behavior has evolved over the past 60 years. This is motivated by the 
belief that initial differences in attitudes and behavior are likely to be eroded over time, especially in 
recent decades when regional mobility and the general level of regional interaction has increased. We find 
no evidence that there has been a change in the difference in civic capital between our communities of 
interest and Italian communities. Specifically, the difference in voter turnout apparent in the late 1940’s, 
early 1950’s remains in the 21st century. This finding has implications for our view of the likelihood of 
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Turnout European Election  0.6585   
(0.1411) 
0.6837    
(0.1137) 
7712 

































Population 3450.142  3126.154     -323.9882    3083.960 2038.450    1045.510*** 
 (2085. 411) (1502.319) (337.686) (2080.927) (1545.356) (253.780) 
Employment/Population 0.142        0.141 0.015 0.270 0.270 0.000    
 (0.068) (0.032)     (0 .013) (0.039) (0.034) (0.005) 
Years of Education 7.119    7.140   0.021 7.097 7.132  -0.035 
 (0.614) (0.466) (0.099) (0.602) (0.475) (0.077) 
Illiteracy Rate (%) 0.042 0.057     -0.012***  0.047 0.059    -0.012***  
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.009) (0.027) (0.032) (0.005) 
Elderly people (over 65) 0.220 0.241 -0.021***    0.218 0.244     -0.026*** 
   (0.058) (0.053) (0.009) (0.055) (0.055) (0.009) 
Altitude 461.594       491.128   - 29.534  445.533    498.900 -53.367 
 (267.581) 267.5807 (184.030) (43.289) (262.157) (188.053) (30.963) 
Area size (squared-km) 40.456     35.399     -5.057    41.162     31.700 9.462   
 (36.512) 28.027 (5.920)  (38.222). (23.456) (3.917) 
Observations 915 40  920 41  
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. In the last column we report the p-value for a test of equality of variable means 






Table 3. Regional fixed effects estimates. Voter Turnout and Arbëreshë communities 
  Referenda European Elections General Elections 
(2011) (1979-2014) (1946-2008) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Arbëreshë 0.0275*** 0.0243*** 0.0336** 0.0351*** 0.0107*** 0.0115*** 
(0.00903) (0.00839) (0.0131) (0.0125) (0.00336) (0.00335) 
Population 0.00451 0.0174*** 0.0132*** 
(0.00498) (0.00573) (0.00155) 
Population sq. -0.000584 -0.00201*** -1.38e-09*** 
(0.000556) (0.000630) (1.82e-10) 
Illteracy Rate (%) -0.00654 -0.235* -0.0545*** 
(0.0975) (0.139) (0.00677) 
Employed 0.0170 0.344*** 0.0487*** 
(0.0569) (0.0680) (0.00591) 
Education 0.0586*** 0.0298*** 
(0.00803) (0.00730) 
Altitude (1000m) 0.0549*** -0.00778 -0.0427*** 
(0.0127) (0.0148) (0.00350) 
Area (sq. km) -0.0000911 -0.00000910 -0.00000389 
(0.0000683) (0.0000819) (0.0000208) 
Constant 0.506*** 0.186*** 0.768*** 0.531*** 0.914*** 0.907*** 
(0.00617) (0.0496) (0.00702) (0.0495) (0.00227) (0.00488) 
Locality FE reg reg reg reg reg reg 
Time FE no no legislature legislature legislature legislature 
N 971 971 7712 7712 16574 16539 
r2 0.102 0.206 0.237 0.281 0.434 0.448 
Notes: The dependent variable is voter turnout, as measured by the number of voters on the number of individuals 
eligible to vote. We control for regional fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions 
were turnout is observed for more than one year. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically 




Table 4. Province fixed effects estimates. Voter Turnout and Arbëreshë communities 
  Referenda European Elections General Elections 
(2011) (1979-2014) (1946-2008) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Arbëreshë 0.0257*** 0.0235*** 0.0237*** 0.0264*** 0.00778** 0.00903*** 
(0.00971) (0.00904) (0.00618) (0.00611) (0.00342) (0.00337) 
Population 0.00215 0.0158*** 0.0142*** 
(0.00473) (0.00278) (0.00151) 
Population sq. -0.000542 -0.00204*** -1.51e-09*** 
(0.000519) (0.000311) (1.77e-10) 
Illteracy Rate (%) 0.0189 -0.235*** -0.0497*** 
(0.101) (0.0670) (0.00679) 
Employed 0.0479 0.233*** 0.0334*** 
(0.0607) (0.0403) (0.00590) 
Education 0.0644*** 0.0276*** 
(0.00844) (0.00379) 
Altitude (1000m) 0.0581*** -0.00689 -0.0351*** 
(0.0132) (0.00710) (0.00356) 
Area (sq. km) 0.0000444 0.000127*** 0.0000609*** 
(0.0000637) (0.0000450) (0.0000226) 
Constant 0.620*** 0.279*** 0.663*** 0.471*** 0.857*** 0.846*** 
(0.0170) (0.0528) (0.00863) (0.0248) (0.00306) (0.00556) 
Locality FE prov prov prov prov prov prov 
Time FE no no legislature legislature legislature legislature 
N 971 971 7712 7712 16574 16539 
r2 0.185 0.300 0.291 0.322 0.463 0.474 
Note: The dependent variable is voter turnout, as measured by the number of voters on the number of individuals 
eligible to vote. We control for province fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the 
regressions were turnout is observed for more than one year. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) are 
reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
28 
 
Table 5. Province fixed effects estimates. Voter Turnout and Arbëreshë communities 
  Referenda European Elections General Elections 
(2011) (1979-2014) (1946-2008) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Radius 30km 60km 30km 60km 30km 60km 30km 60km 
Arbëreshë 0.0231*** 0.0179** 0.0265*** 0.0226*** 0.0109*** 0.0110*** 0.0208*** 0.0207*** 
(0.00896) (0.00903) (0.00613) (0.00607) (0.00340) (0.00347) (0.0778) (0.00491) 
Time Trend -0.0034*** -0.0033*** 
(0.00008) (0.00007) 
Trend*Arbreshe -0.0003 -0.0003 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
Locality FE prov prov prov prov prov prov prov prov 
Time FE no no year year year year no no 
N 820 554 6553 4407 10174 6631 6631 10174 
r2 0.319 0.408 0.297 0.255 0.473 0.476 0.382 0.374 
Notes: The dependent variable is voter turnout, as measured by the number of voters on the number of individuals eligible to vote. We control for 
province fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions were turnout is observed for more than one year (with the 
exception of column 4). Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The 






Table 6. IV Estimates. Arbëreshë and Voter Turnout 
  Referenda European Elections General Elections 
(2011) (1979-2014) (1946-2008) 
Panel A 
 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Arbëreshë 0.132*** 0.117** 0.263*** 0.165*** 0.0830*** 0.0588** 
(0.0380) (0.0508) (0.0508) (0.0563) (0.0318) (0.0270) 
Population 0.00673 0.00668 0.0218*** 0.0174*** 0.0128*** 0.0141*** 
(0.00477) (0.00469) (0.00527) (0.00591) (3.96) (3.94) 
Population sq. -0.000774 -0.000789 -0.00236*** -0.00201*** -1.31e-09*** -1.45e-09*** 
(0.000547) (0.000519) (0.000590) (0.000659) (-3.42) (-3.61) 
Illteracy Rate (%) 0.00907 -0.263*** -0.276** -0.423*** -0.0583*** -0.0674*** 
(0.0957) (0.0970) (0.132) (0.129) (-5.80) (-5.17) 
Employed -0.0182 0.0234 0.320*** 0.536*** 0.0375*** 0.0656*** 
(0.0614) (0.0614) (0.0583) (0.0603) (2.77) (5.67) 
Education 0.0590*** 0.0465*** 0.0268*** 0.0214*** 
(0.00839) (0.00856) (0.00738) (0.00632) 
Altitude 0.0537*** 0.0599*** -0.0102 -0.0280** -0.0430*** -0.0534*** 
(0.0120) (0.0123) (0.0137) (0.0131) (-5.20) (-5.98) 
Area (sq. km) -0.0000830 -0.0000420 0.0000109 0.000160** 0.00000331 0.0000678 
(0.0000703) (0.0000689) (0.0000843) (0.0000800) (0.06) (0.92) 
Constant 0.183*** 0.296*** 0.537*** 0.494*** 0.911*** 0.846*** 
(0.0498) (0.0528) (0.0491) (0.0415) (0.0112) (0.00987) 
Locality FE reg prov reg prov reg prov 
Time FE no no legislature legislature legislature legislature 
N 971 971 7712 7712 16395 16395 
r2 0.212 0.204 0.291 0.262 0.451 0.436 
Panel B   
First Stage 
Distance -0.0310*** -0.0423*** -0.0340*** -0.0441*** -0.0274*** -0.0394*** 
(0.00524) (0.00775) (0.00527) (0.00792) (0.00476) (0.00761) 
Distance2 0.0000875*** 0.000165*** 0.0000993*** 0.000170*** 0.0000774*** 0.000155*** 
(0.0000222) (0.0000427) (0.0000228) (0.0000443) (0.0000190) (0.0000387) 
First Stage Chi2 66 293.2 13.75 12.78 11.79 10.18 
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.2145 0.2851 0.2275 0.2862 0.201 0.2567 
N 971 971 7712 7712 16395 16395 
Notes: The dependent variable is voter turnout, as measured by the number of voters on the number of individuals eligible to vote. We 
control for regional (odd columns) or provincial (even columns) fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the 
regressions were turnout is observed for more than one year. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) are reported in parenthesis. 
The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 7. Additional Robustness Checks 
PANEL A Maintenance of Language 
 Referenda EU 
Arbëreshë Intensity 0.037*** 0.042*** 
[0.011] [0.008] 
R2 0.301 0.323 
PANEL B   Greek Communities  
 Referenda EU 
Arbëreshë   0.024*** 0.026*** 
 [0.009] [0.006] 
Greek Communities -0.026 0.014 
 [0.019] [0.009] 
R2 0.301 0.322 
PANEL C  Orthodox vs Non-Orthodox Villages 
 Referenda EU 
Arbëreshë  (Orthodox) 0.031*** 0.034*** 
 [0.012] [0.008] 
Arbëreshë  (Non-Orthodox) 0.022* 0.020** 
 [0.013] [0.009] 
R2 0.301 0.323 
Notes: The dependent variable is voter turnout, as measured by the number of voters on the number of individuals eligible to vote. 
All models include province fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions were turnout is 
observed for more than one year. All other controls as in table 4.  Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
the municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant 
















TABLE 8. Arbëreshë and Tax Compliance 
Note: The dependent variable is the TV Licence compliance rate. Locality fixed effects as reported. OLS estimates in columns (1)-
(3).  IV estimates in column (4) and (5). Controls as in Table 3, col (2) and (4). Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) in 
parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
 
Figure 1: Panel (a): Map of Italy, with regional borders. In red: regions with Arbreshe settlements, 
including provincial (sub-regional) borders. Panel (b): regions with Arbreshe settlements, with (in 
blue) Arbreshe villages and (green X) location of seminaries. 
 (a)  (b) 
OLS 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Arbrëshë 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.104*** 0.108** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.036) (0.047) 
N 972 972 972 973 973 
r2/ Pseudo-r2 0.045 0.129 0.200 0.244 0.295 
Locality FE none reg prov reg prov 
First Stage F-stat 33.132 28.323 
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